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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the history of foreign investment in Latin America in the two centuries since
independence. Investment flows to the region were sometimes large and always volatile. Symptoms
of overborrowing, sudden stops, debt, default and crises have been evident from the beginning. In
general the economies in the hemisphere struggled for most of the nineteenth century to develop
reputations for macroeconomic stability and sound finance, and foreign capital was thus repelled for
the long periods. In the twentieth century, most of the region, like the rest of the world, turned
inward and against foreign capital markets, a policy trend that emerged in the interwar period and
has only recently begun to reverse. These historical perspectives shed light on the region's current








To understand the impact of globalization on the developing countries of the periphery,
one has to study Latin America. As historians of the area understand, this is the region
whose economic fortunes have been most significantly shaped by external forces in the
five centuries since the voyages of discovery first made a global economy a distant, but
realizable, possibility. Only late in this process, from the nineteenth century, did external
capital markets play any major role, but once in place they became important in many
dimensions. They served as an engine of growth for the region, changed patterns of
income distribution and sectoral growth, and as a problem in political economy they
prompted complex and ambivalent responses which shaped subsequent development.
The subject of this chapter is capital flows between countries or regions, that is,
international investments. Specifically I consider only their long-term function, focusing
on areas other than the “needs of trade” (short-term commercial credit) a topic that is best
reserved for discussions on the evolution of international trade. My goal is to document
what we know of these flows. In the colonial period there is not much evidence, but the
flows were probably small. In the nineteenth century, when good records begin, the flows
increased over time as global capital market integration increased. Economic growth had
fallen behind the core countries in the early 1800s, as the struggles for independence
weighed on this peripheral region and the industrial revolution lifted the core, but parts of
the region managed to regain ground in the late 1800s, and capital inflows helped. In the
region, as in the rest of the world, the twentieth century record of global capital market
integration is famous for its U-shape: high in the early and late decades, and low in the
middle, but the upswing of the 1980s and 1990s is still more a feature of the developed
than the developing countries.
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By many measures, Latin America is still much less globalized today than 100
years ago in capital markets, and the persistent postwar legacy of controls, interventions,
and distortions is largely responsible. This conclusion offers both hope and gloom: if the
benefits of tapping into the global capital markets can be enjoyed again, the region could
enjoy an era of investment-led growth like that seen a century ago. Why it has not done
so already suggests significant political and institutional obstacles to that end.
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The Colonial Backdrop
Although this chapter focuses on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we should say a
word about antecedents. “Globalization” has swept into Latin America in four waves
after European contact according to a persuasive chronology of that slippery concept
presented by Coatsworth.
2 We are concerned here only with the economic manifestations
of globalization, and in the first two centuries after 1492 economic interaction was
limited indeed, and confined to the trade in a small quantity of goods, and the migration
of a small numbers of peoples.
The extent of “economic globalization” under the Spanish empire circa 1700 was
much smaller than that found under the British empire two centuries later. Throughout
the colonial period, however, capital flows of the type we wish to study were very small
in all countries. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this is perhaps not too
surprising. The instruments of market-based international investment were not truly
established on any scale within a European context until the development of securities
markets in Amsterdam and London in the late seventeenth century, and their use did not
spread further until much later.
3
Did it matter that such flows were so small? Did this reflect the institutional
failure of the colonizing power, as argued by North, and a failure to see the development
potential of the region? Or did the region actually prosper quite well all the same?
Coatsworth found that the region enjoyed respectably high per capita incomes on the eve
of  independence,  perhaps  66%  of  the  U.S.  level.  Certainly  there  was  no  “great
divergence” between the region and the core at that time. To the extent that investment
played a role in economic growth, along Solovian lines, we might infer that pre-modern
pre-industrial growth in the colonial period was supported by a supply of local saving that
was small, but ample for the modest demands of the time.
The coming of the modern era, and the economic shocks of the nineteenth
century, changed this equilibrium. In growth terms, Latin America had kept pace with the
developed countries in the preceding centuries. The nineteenth century was when Latin
America fell behind, with only a hint of convergence at the end of that era. What role did
the external capital market play in this new growth environment?
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The First Frenzy
Connections to a wider capital market expanded in the postcolonial era. The countries of
an independent Latin America could approach the burgeoning international capital
markets of Northwestern Europe in search of funds, for their fledgling governments
seeking to establish security and infrastructure, and later for their private sectors in search
of development finance. This was a time of potentially fortuitous coincidence of wants.
The borrower was capital scarce, with funds needed for nation-building and economic
development. The lenders were increasingly capital abundant, as modern economic
growth generated increasing savings, accumulation, and diminishing returns at home.
Only a mediation of the arbitrage opportunity was needed, but this required a
political and institutional foundation, in addition to the technical apparatus of financial
markets that had developed over centuries. The most significant early investors in this
period were the British, who in the 1820s were excited at the prospects for overseas
investment in an emerging market expected to enjoy fine economic prospects once freed
from the yoke of Iberian imperialism and its restrictive economic practices. The decisive
victory at the Battle of Ayacucho in December 1824 coincided with a bull market on the
Royal  Exchange,  and  Marichal  notes  that  a  “financial  fever  intensified  with  the
announcement that silver-mining enterprises would be formed to exploit the legendary
riches of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil.” In 1822 government bond issues were
floated by Colombia, Chile, Peru, and the fictitious “Poyais” with a face value of £3.65
million; in 1824 by Colombia and Peru (again) plus Buenos Aires, Brazil and Mexico to
the  tune  of  £10.4  million;  and  in  1825  by  Peru  (yet  again)  plus  Brazil,  Mexico,
Guadalajara, and Central America for a further £7.1 million. Selling at a moderate
discount, these £21 million in government bonds realized on net £16 million for the
borrowers. Private parties also joined the frenzy with mining companies alone raising
£3.5 million in capital, and gaining authorization for up to £24.1 million. This investment
boom  dominated  activity  in  London  for  a  couple  of  years  and  far  exceeded  any
investment in other regions of the world. Of the 624 new issues on the Royal Exchange in
this period, 46 were Latin American, but being large enterprises they accounted for
almost a third of total investment.
4
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Many of these IPOs turned out to be a fraud. Rippy describes the period as a
“wild speculation spree” on the part of credulous British investors who put up their
capital for improbable schemes.
Associations were formed to obtain precious metals from the Andean cordilleras,
where there were few workers, no fuel for the fires, and no roads for the vehicles;
technicians and machinery were hurried off in utmost ignorance of the almost
impenetrable mountains and matted jungles that awaited them, There were
companies to fish for pearls, to inaugurate steamboat lines, to cut through the
American isthmus, to furnish steam engines for mints, to establish colonies of
farmers and herdsmen. A churning company was formed to send out milkmaids to
the pampas; furs and warming pans were shipped to the tropics!
5
Thus the new adventure turned sour. When political uncertainties and fiscal burdens
escalated  in  the  wars  of  independence  and  subsequent  civil  wars  the  unseasoned
sovereign borrowers soon found themselves with no means to service the loans, and a
wave a defaults ensued. Losses were heavy, and some issues tanked precipitously, as
when, reported by Rippy, “the Poyais loan of 1822, the bonanza investment offered by
‘King’ Gregor McGregor, rose only a point above the issue price of 80, but soon
descended to the appropriate level of 0.”
6 All of these government bond issue were in
default  by  1827,  and  many  remained  in  arrears,  in  some  cases  for  decades.  The
investments in mining, canals, steamboats, butter and the rest fared no better.
7
Economies in the region suffered deep macroeconomic instability for decades,
bond issues went into default, new lending dried up, and a resort to seigniorage ignited
the inflationary fire that has raged or smoldered ever since. The still ongoing pattern of
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6 McGregor, a swashbuckling émigré Scots clansman who fought alongside the liberator Bolívar, invented
the kingdom of Poyais to embellish an area of miasmal swamplands on the Mosquito Coast that had been
granted to him by an Indian elder. Self-styled a Prince, he and his bride (Bolívar’s niece) were then
received at the court of George IV as honored guests. Having fooled the royals and gained celebrity, Gregor
was able to sell junk Poyais bonds (and real estate)￿ in London, Edinburgh and Paris, was subsequently
jailed in England and France, escaped each time, and returned with his Princess to Venezuela as a hero.
7 Rippy (1959, 18–21); Stone (1977, 692).5
lending booms followed by a default crisis and macroeconomic adjustment was thus
inaugurated in the region, a topic to which we shall return later. Suitably chastened,
foreign investors held off from investing in the region until political and economic
stability seemed more assured, and waited for a resolution of outstanding debts (Table 1).
In the long-nineteenth century, Britain’s long-standing involvement in the region
was to endure, but not without more of these ups and downs. In addition to being the
leading foreign investor in the nineteenth century, Britain was the “preeminent” foreign
investor in Latin America from 1820 to 1914. After the 1820s fiasco, foreign capital beat
a retreat from the region. Popular memory of the swindles of 1824–25 would fade, but
erratically. Seventy years on, Oscar Wilde made an Argentine canal scam a central part of
the plot of An Ideal Husband.
The  notion  that  modern  capital  markets  have  a  weak  memory  is  certainly
pervasive and the benefits of reputation can seem hard to detect. Nonetheless, many of
these bad debtors paid for their defaults by being excluded for long period from the
financial markets.
8 With some justification, Rippy refers to the initial experience of
investment in Latin America as one of “early imprudence and vexation.”
The Second Surge
Despite vexation, the keenest investors were not to be deterred forever. By the 1850s
“there was a marked renewal of interest in Latin America by the London capital market
with the flotation of new government bond issues and the commencement of railroad
investment.”
9 Enthusiasm grew in the next two decades, even if the investors were by
now savvy enough to avoid the riskier locations and follow the signals given by the few
countries that had tried, however sporadically, to maintain some kind of debt service. Of
the various 1820s sovereign issues that quickly failed, only the Brazilian default was
quickly resolved in 1829, but most remained in default for decades, with refunding
attempts frequently subject to failure as well, as shown in Table 1. As Rippy noted,
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In view of this record, one might have expected British investors to shy away
from Latin American government securities. But grandsons seem to profit little
from the experience of their grandfathers in the investment field. During the
1860’s and early 1870s Englishmen went on another investment spree. It is true
that they revealed no enthusiasm for the issues of Colombia, Ecuador, and some
of the Central American countries, but they seemed eager to invest in the
government paper of most of the others involved in the defaults following the
boom of the 1820’s.
10
Despite the checkered debt history of the region, flows did resume and “the trickle of
British investments of the 1830’s and 1840’s became a fairly large stream during the next
three decades, branching out into at least seventeen countries.”
11 By 1880 these new
investments had accumulated into a sizeable stock that dwarfed the cumulative totals of
the previous boom in the 1820s, and by then a total of £179 million was outstanding to
Britain, £123 million in government bonds (69 percent) and £56 million in private
enterprises (Table 2).
One of the main fundamentals behind this new surge in investment was the trade
boom experienced by the region, and most of the world, from the 1850s until the onset of
the  Great  Depression  of  the  1870s.  This  brought  increased  economic  activity  to
merchants  and  landowners,  more  exports  and  imports,  and  thus  more  revenues
(principally from customs duties) that governments could use to amortize loans. The
continued dominance of the public sector was based on three very different types of loan:
loans for rolling over old debts, loans for military purposes, and loans for railway
construction, which was heavily state supported. Only the latter represented a real net
contribution to local capital formation, most of which was supplied by the slow and
steady accretion of retained profits in a world of financial underdevelopment. Thus, the
significance of these flows should not be overstated for overall economic development.
Yet they represented a major increase in leverage for the public sector and a test of the
governments’  creditworthiness  after  three  decades  of  “financial  hibernation.”  A
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remarkable total of fifty major foreign loans were negotiated from 1850 to 1873, most of
them in London, and a few in Paris and other European markets
12
The impacts of the boom varied by country. Some countries now looked like a
good bet. With respect to sovereign loans, Brazil had worked harder than other countries
to honor debts and was duly rewarded with the largest share. Rippy notes that “during the
sixty years following 1824 Englishmen preferred Brazil as a field of investment to any
other Latin American country, largely for the reason that Brazil was politically more
stable.”
13 One might add, that as a consequence Brazil could get her act together to
service debt.
Other countries did not. For example, not until the Argentines resolved their
internecine disputes and settled the national question in the 1860s (and made some
attempt to resume service old debts in 1857) did capital again flow beginning with the
national government’s loans of 1866 and 1868, the latter critical for the Paraguayan war.
Several Argentine provinces also floated loans in 1870–74. Even the defeated Paraguay
sold its first bonds in London in 1871. Uruguay and Bolivia could do likewise in 1872
(the first Bolivian issue in 1864 had failed). Chile floated issues in 1858, 1865, 1866,
1867, 1870 and 1873 totaling £8.5 million. Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras all
issued non-refinancing debt (i.e., net inflows) in the peak of the investment boom from
1867 to 1872.
14
The terms of these loans varied greatly, and reflected a high variance in interest
rates across debtors worldwide, prior to a great convergence in these rates up to 1914,
which we shall discuss shortly. Many of these loans were floated at less than favorable
interest rates, reflecting a high assessment of country risk by the creditors, which we can
say with hindsight was a wise judgment. The country risk also correlated roughly with
past bad behavior—both how bad it was, and how past. In this period a “good” risk like
Brazil or Chile could float loans with 5 percent coupons at 80 or 90 for a yield of under 6
percent. Peru did about as well. Argentine coupons ran to 6 or 7 percent, and the issues
sold at around 90. Costa Rica floated 6s and 7s and sold them for about 70. War-torn
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Paraguay’s coupons paid 8 percent and Honduras as high as 10, but such issues could not
sell for more than 80.
15
As in the 1820s, however, there were intimations again of an “overborrowing”
binge, and questions soon surfaced about the ability of governments, some of them still
governing relatively immature and unstable polities, to fulfill their promises to pay on
this new mountain of debt. Some loans emerged with a bad smell, most notoriously the
Paraguayan fraud: the country was in total disarray after defeat and could never repay, a
state of affairs that did not trouble the bankers who had received their commission or the
corrupt politicians who had whisked the gold credits off to Argentina bank accounts and
real estate. The worst abuses tended to be in the smaller republics, often aided and
abetted by the European financiers.
16 Their governments’ loss of reputation was to have
consequences for their access to credit when new lending resumed. But even the genuine
loans in the larger republics caused servicing problems as the depression spread.
A global macroeconomic and financial crisis was stirring yet again, and a second
wave of defaults soon spread over the region in the 1870s. By the end of 1880 of the
£123 million of British capital invested in Latin American government bonds, more than
£71 million (58 percent) were in default (see Table 2). This was only a small part of a
much wider global debt crisis: already as of 1876 fifteen non-European nations had
defaulted to the tune of £300 million, including in that very year the large defaults by
Peru, Egypt and Turkey. The capital flows again ground to a halt and irate bondholders
chased down the insolvent republics long into the 1880s.
 The creditors tended to emerge
victorious,  but  the  settlements  were  drawn  out  and  the  payoff  was  incomplete.
17
Defaulting governments were shut out of new borrowing during negotiations and often
for many years beyond.
The crisis cemented in investors mind the untrustworthiness of Latin American
sovereign borrowers, a reputation that was to expand in the years ahead and which
persists even to this day. According to Tomz, of the 77 government defaults from 1820 to
1914, 58 involved Latin American countries, and from 1914 to 1931, 13 of 21. Compared
to other periphery countries, the economic potential and sovereign independence of the
region obviously encouraged this outcome: the potential for high returns encouraged
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more borrowing ex ante and the independence from Empire gave more freedom to default
ex post. Yet, clearly the borrowers in the region could not manage their fiscal affairs with
anything approaching the prudence of most borrowers in the core countries. Figure 1
shows the incidence of sovereign default in the region from 1820 to 1940 and the fraction
of years that debtors spent in default status is impressive, 38% on average. The better-
behaved borrowers like Uruguay (12%) or Brazil (17%) managed to maintain a pretty
clean sheet, but the odds of getting repayment from others like Honduras (79%) or
Mexico (57%) were no more favorable than a coin toss.
18
The 1870s crisis bore some similarities to the events of the 1820s, obviously, but
there was one key difference. The poor behavior of the sovereign borrowers was not in
any way matched by the private sector, an important divergence. It was not only the
sovereign borrowers but private enterprises that returned to the capital markets in the
1860s and 1870s. In the frenzy of the 1820s only a handful of firms had paid a nonzero
return on investment, and even then most had failed by 1850. For a while little private
capital had flowed to the region, but this had begun to change.
By 1875, 77 Latin American firms were listed on London’s Royal Exchange.
19 In
mining, of the 18 British companies operating in Latin Amerca in 1880, only 3 dated
from before 1850, and 9 had been founded in the 1870s. Railway investment got on track
in a small way in 1849, but again the major construction boom had been in the 1870s, and
in the 34 railroads with British stakes, 24 had been set up in the 1870s. Three tramways,
four sanitation projects, and seven submarine telegraph companies were set up by the
British from 1868 to 1880. Of the £56 million total of foreign capital invested in private
enterprise, £34 million sat in railways, £11 million in public utilities, and £3 million in
mining. These were widely dispersed over a dozen countries (see Table 2). Other
enterprises supported included shipping, an emerging banking and finance sector, some
meat processing and packing on the pampas, and guano in Peru. Real estate investment
remained very limited.
20
In fact, the private enterprises established in Latin America continued to pay
handsomely, and an investor widely diversified in the region would have noticed a
marked asymmetry between the public and private shares of the portfolio. In 1880, the
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£56 million of investments in private enterprise, though less than half the size of the
sovereign debt, generated a far larger income for investors, since the former probably
yielded at least 6 percent of par value, but only £52 million of the government loans were
actually being serviced, for a yield of perhaps 2 percent of total par value. Most private
firms paid good dividends and serviced their debts promptly.
21
Soon the usual accusations were flying. Rippy summarized the first sixty years of
foreign investment in the region’s government bonds as a “decidedly poor investment”
and asserted that “British bankers and not a few Latin-American governments alike had
been scandalously dishonest. English bankers, brokers, and exporters and grafting Latin-
American bureaucrats had profited at the expense of British investors.”
22
Two Great Waves and a Great Crash
A new investment boom began in the 1880s, bigger than before, as the global depression
receded and economic activity, and especially trade, recovered. Rebuilding a tattered
reputation took time for the public borrowers, especially for the defaulting governments.
Investment flows changed accordingly. By 1890 over half of the London issues went to
the private sector.
23 The overall flows were massive, and by the end of 1890 total British
investments were £426 million, more than double the 1880 total. Of this, £194 million sat
in government bonds, surpassed by a slightly higher share, £231 million, in private
enterprises.
24 After an intervening global depression in the 1890s, and a particularly nasty
financial and macroeconomic crisis centered on the River Plate, this investment boom
was to resume with even greater vigor from 1900 to 1914, at least for the nations lucky
enough to have access to the market.
It was soon quite clear that the regional distribution of the investment was to favor
only a few countries, namely those that prospered the most in the new trade boom. In the
1880s capital inflows to the region were concentrated in just 5 countries: 37 percent in
Argentina, 17 percent in Mexico, 14 percent in Brazil, 7 percent in Chile and 5 percent in
Uruguay. Other countries, where trade stagnated, such as Peru and Colombia, received
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little new investment. Looking at government loan issues, the flows were even more
skewed, with 60 percent of all new loans going to Argentina and Uruguay, leading
Marichal to term the 1880s a time of “loan frenzy on the Río de la Plata”; more generally,
this period seemed to open a new era in Latin American economic history where “the
overall picture is one of a handful of economically dynamic nations that had begun to
outstrip the poorer republics of the subcontinent in terms of growth rates.” Foreign capital
played its part in creating this distinction.
25 There is another way to look at the division:
of the big five, four had maintained debt service in the previous crisis; they were
rewarded, but defaulters were not.
26
Capital flows now supported all manner of infrastructure and industry. Railways
were always the largest component of these investments, but other important uses
included tramways, buses, electricity, canals and docks, finance and land. Despite the
initial promise and the widespread perception (which last until today) that the region’s
growth would center on the exploitation of its mineral wealth using imported capital,
mining and other raw materials enterprises never constituted more than 4 percent of
foreign investment after 1865.
27 Instead, other economic enterprises rose to prominence.
Railways accounted for an enormous share, and in 1890 comprised £146 million (93
companies) of the £231 million (289 companies) invested in the private sector. Public
utilities came next with £20 million in 42 enterprises; mining accounted for £13 million
in 69 firms; and real estate had grown considerably with £8 million in 22 firms. Nitrates,
finance, shipping and manufacturing each account for £4 to £5 million.
28
External developments made this surge of foreign investment in the region
possible. In the latter half of the nineteenth century a free-wheeling global capital market,
still centered on London, began to boldly supply credit to the developing world within
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and beyond the empire.
29 The important distinction noted by Stone—a gradually rising
share of private sector recipients in total British foreign investment—was not true just of
the Latin American share, but of the entire portfolio.
30 One might interpret this as
evidence of a tendency over time toward greater depth, integration, and maturity in the
London market.
31
Although impressive in its reach, the universality of this market should not be
taken for granted—the country risk perceived by foreign investors remained high and
only a handful or Latin American countries had reputation enough regularly to issue
external debt. Even as late as 1913, the point of deepest maturation of the global capital
market before the 1980s and 1990s, the five countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico
and Uruguay accounted for 90% of outstanding Latin American issues in London.
Countries like Peru and Venezuela made occasional issues, often merely rollovers of
earlier defaults. Others were out of the game entirely.
32
For  the  major  players,  an  examination  of  bond  yields  allows  us  a  crude
comparative perspective. Figure 2 shows the London bond spread relative to the British
Consol on government bond issues for a select group of Latin American countries. It can
be seen that before 1890 the spread was much greater than that prevailing on bonds
issued by governments in core countries and in the British Empire, though not unusual by
the standards of the periphery. The average spread was about 300–500 basis points in
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, around 1,000 in Uruguay and Mexico.
Why were spreads so high, much higher than in the empire? Investors seem to
have perceived the risks of default as quite grave in these independent countries, even if
gunboat diplomacy and other hardball tactics could, in a desperate moment, be used to
enforce some kind of partial repayment. If Latin America was part of some informal
empire, it must have been very informal indeed, insufficient to buy it any special
preferential access to the capital markets. The spreads are important, however, since, as
in all markets, price is likely to affect quantities demanded. The unobserved countries
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with prohibitively high spreads were effectively priced out of the market. Of those in the
market, the economies with lower costs of capital could justify a larger range of
investment projects than those more tightly rationed. Only an integrated view of price and
quantity data can keep this link in view.
After peace broke out in the region, political stability in the recipient countries
was an important stimulus, but institutional conditions were highly favorable to these
developments. International capital controls were unknown in this era, and a gradual
convergence of national economic policies on the gold standard supplied “common
currency” externalities. Besides promoting trade, the gold standard also facilitated capital
mobility not just through lowered transaction costs and reduced exchange risk, but by
providing some kind of a commitment mechanism. Evidence shows that countries that
adhered to gold in this era benefited from a lower cost of capital, whereas membership in
the British Empire had relatively little effect.
33
Thus, as costs fell, demand rose, and agents from the private and public sector
sought funding from foreign markets that appeared better disposed than in the past. After
a global retrenchment during the 1870s recession, the first great wave of capital flowed in
to the region in the 1880s, was halted by a crash, with a further wave to follow from the
late 1890s until 1913. Moreover, although the principal source was always Britain,
several other creditor countries now invested heavily in the region, expanding the supply
of capital. The United States’ long-term investments in Latin American grew from $308
million in 1897 to $1.6 billion in 1914; French assets grew from $651 million in 1902 to
$1.7 billion in 1913. German holdings were estimated at $678 million in 1918. These
figures compare to a British total of £1.2 billion ($5.8 billion) in 1913.
34
Over the course of a few decades a very significant amount of foreign capital thus
entered Latin America rising from initially almost insignificant levels. By late in the
period, around 1900–13, for the largest countries the ratio of foreign capital to GDP stood
at around 2.7, its highest level in history in a developing region. For comparison, in
Africa the level was 1.1, in Asia only 0.4. In this era, scaling appropriately for this
perspective by the size of the recipient economy, the most exposed emerging-market for
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foreign investment was Latin America. This was the region in the world economy most
assisted by, and yet most at the mercy of, external forces in the capital market (Table 3).
35
Hence, at least for those countries, regions, and industries involved, it can rightly
be claimed that “the connection of the industrial centre with Latin America was the
driving force behind the capital accumulation process throughout the continent.” Whence
came this remarkable inflow? The two major investment sources for the entire period
1870–1914 were Europe and the United States. Europe’s investments came earlier and
were  spread  more  broadly  through  the  region;  Britain’s  investments  were  most
prominent, followed by France and Germany, all three going heavily to the major
economies of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. U.S. investments came later and were more
heavily weighted toward direct investment and geographically more concentrated in
Mexico and Cuba.
 The two major creditors, overall, were Britain and the United States.
Britain accounted for around half of the foreign investment at this time, the United States
for almost 20%. Though a sectoral breakdown is not within the scope of a paper directed
at long-run macroeconomic trends, we can note that over the entire pre-1914 period
public debt issues absorbed perhaps one quarter of these flows. Private-sector direct
investments (including portfolio investment in “free standing companies”) accounted for
about three quarters. Railroads and public utilities, key infrastructure components, were
of particular importance in the latter.
36
An overview of forty years of inflows, seen as a whole, obscures one important
detail of the process, however: its fluctuations, and occasionally sharp volatility. The
bond yield data hints that the costs of credit were far from smooth, and an examination of
the correlations of quantity with these price shocks fills out the picture. As in developing
country contexts today, international investment flows were often rudely interrupted by
crises, leading to sudden stops, even reversals. In Table 4 we can follow this process in
some detail based on Stone’s record of capital calls in the London market (unfortunately,
similarly detailed annual data is not available for other source countries).
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The  1880s  were  famously  years  of  “heavy  borrowing”—to  use  Williams’s
description of the country which went to the well more than anyone, Argentina, where
British investment grew by a factor of six in the 1880s (24% per annum).
37 Mexico’s
exposure quintupled, and Brazil and Uruguay’s almost tripled. Peru saw little change. For
the region as a whole, British investment swelled at a rate 8% per annum for ten years,
more than doubling. The slump in the 1890s is in stark contrast: investments grew at a
mere 3% per annum, though this decadal rate disguises a period of stagnation from 1890
to 1895. After 1900 investments in the region continued to grow at a respectable rate until
1913, but again only in certain countries, jumping up by a factor of four in Cuba, and
doubling in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The patterns are similar for both private
and total investment (Table 4).
What benefits did foreign capital bring to the region? Using a rough capital-output
ratio of 4, we might guess that during this historical era about one third of the capital
stock of Latin America was supplied from external sources, a striking contribution.
Certainly, no developing country or region today enjoys such a large boost to its capital
stock from overseas, and the positive growth implications can be gleaned from a simple
counterfactual that imagines such capital being instantaneously removed: wages and
output levels would have plummeted. Table 5 explores such a simplified counterfactual
using Twomey’s data and the results show what a positive contribution foreign capital
made to aggregate development circa 1913. In its absence, and ceteris paribus, incomes
in the region would have been about 17% lower on average, which a much greater loss in
countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, where foreign capital played a bigger role.
38
These benefits were significant, but did not come without some offsetting costs,
however, since open capital markets required greater discipline, could quickly punish the
guilty for their inconsistent policies, and even hurt innocent bystanders through and
volatility during the business cycle and contagion during periodic crises. Not every crisis
large and small warrants mention here. Many defaults were isolated and some defaults
simple went on for years. The troubles that beset the region’s least creditworthy countries
mattered less—capital was flowing at such a dribbling rate into most of these inveterate
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defaulters, and at such a high cost in risk, that an interruption in its movement was not a
major event. These countries struggled along relying more on domestic saving to finance
investment and government finance. This isolated them more from the volatility of the
global capital market—but it also restricted their saving supply and choked off growth, a
harsh tradeoff. However, the major crises in the 1890s for two major foreign capital
recipients deserves mention.
The first crisis was in Argentina, where a calamitous monetary and financial
crash, the Baring Crash, brought capital inflows to a screeching halt and plunged the
economy into a deep recession for several years. As may be seen from Figure 2, country
risk exploded not only in Argentina, but, in a classic example of contagion, throughout
the region. Neighboring Uruguay was badly affected. Students of the global capital
market also see connections to events in Australia and the United States.
This was arguably the world’s first example of a modern “emerging market”
crisis, combining debt crisis, bank collapse, maturity and currency mismatches, and
contagion. As financial development and monetization in Latin American economies
grew in the late nineteenth century government-induced macroeconomic crises were felt
more widely. As sovereign risk spreads expanded the capital market tightened. Domestic
banks found themselves in distress, and a credit crunch followed, squeezing local
borrowers. Whereas government defaults in the 1820s and 1870s could bypass pre-
modern economic modes of production that relied more on retained profits and less on
financial intermediation, by the 1890s the region’s more modern economies risked more
resounding economic crises after a default.
Argentina’s bold development strategy of the 1880s had bubble tendencies from
the start, employing as it did a nefarious leveraging system involving the banking sector,
which borrowed short in gold, and lent long in pesos. When this scheme exploded the
fiscal gap could be covered only by money printing, which predictably broke the
exchange rate peg in short order, and sent the economy into an inflation spiral and a
generalized  financial  and  banking  crisis.
39  For  Argentina,  stabilization  and  debt
restructuring took the better part of a decade, and in these years foreign capital again
bided its time, while a global recession contributed to a delayed recovery. New capital
flows began as country risk gradually fell in the mid-1890s.
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The other major crisis then hit, in Brazil. It was viewed by commentators at the
time almost as a replay of the Baring crash, and there is evidence to suggestion that
contagion in country risk from Argentina to Brazil was a contributing factor. Yet there
was much else going haywire in Brazil’s plan for rapid economic development known as
the Encilhamento. Political instability was great in the first years of the 1890s following
the proclamation of the Republic, the country was adjusting to the abolition of slavery,
the gold standard had been abandoned, and inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies had
the printing presses running at high speed. The money supply almost doubled in the year
1890 alone, and a stock market bubble was underway. The currency steadily devalued by
a factor of 3.5 from 1890 to 1898, adding to the domestic costs of debt service. Yet,
remarkably, the country maintained debt service, and kept issuing new debt to finance
ongoing deficits, obtaining new funding from London in 1895–97. and did not default
until 1898–1900, and again in 1902–09. However, the real economy was by now in deep
recession, having never really recovered from the financial instability of the early 1890s.
Matters were made even worse by a severe terms of trade shock caused by a steep decline
in coffee prices on world markets. In 1898 the government could no longer meet its
obligations. Bonds which had traded at 90 in 1890 were by then trading at 50.
40
The two crises did bear one similarity—with each other, as well as with the events
of 2001–03. Both Argentina and Brazil had cranked up their government debt levels at a
fast pace. There was and is but one cause for this phenomenon—persistent and large
deficits, and inability of a government to balance its books and set out a sustainable debt
path. But eventually Argentina and Brazil each hit a debt ceiling, and markets were
unwilling to roll it over one more time. Both paid a price during messy clean ups that
followed. Argentina’s national debt service was backstopped by rollovers agreed to by
the 1891 Rothschild Committee, but at such a punitive interest rate that the deal had to be
renegotiated almost immediately by Romero in 1891; the provincial and municipal issues
were in disarray for the better part of a decade before being nationalized at a deep
discount, a bailout that still appears questionable. Brazil’s 1898 Funding Loan, another
Rothschild product, had conditions as harsh as any IMF agreement.
A broader overview of this heyday of international capital markets can give a
better sense of the volatility of capital flows and their stop-and-go nature, Figure 3
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presents annual data on capital flows to the region. The Baring Crash emerges as a major
convulsion, but by no means the only important capital-market crisis during this period.
If the trends are compared to the default and risk data (Figures 1 and 2) a more complete
picture of the global crises emerges. Booms were typically associated with a convergence
in bond spreads; defaults were associated with a sudden stop of capital flows and
dramatically increased country risk.
The global capital market quickly recovered from the crisis of the 1890s, although
countries badly affected, most notably Argentina, took longer to recover. However,
compared to the 1870s boom and bust, this one was not associated with widespread
default in the region, but rather a more general and global increase in country risk that
slowed foreign capital flows for the better part of a decade. Inflows to Argentina and
Uruguay were sluggish in the 1890s, but in other countries in the region the tap was still
open as shown in Table 4. Foreign investments had grown at a frenzied 12 percent per
annum in the 1880s in the “Big 7” countries (20 percent in Argentina!) and this slowed to
just 2 percent in the 1890s (and just 2 percent in Argentina).
When flows resumed they were brisk, and investments grew now at 6 percent per
annum in the “Big 7”, as shown in Table 4. British private investments in the region
doubled from 1900 to 1913, and overall increased by about 60%, showing the continuing
trend toward more private investment. Britain in 1900 was still the principal investor with
over half of the investments in the region. Other core countries were joining in quickly.
In 1900 France and the United States became major players in the region, and by 1913
they each held about 18% of foreign investment in the region. Of the rest, Germany held
about 10%, Britain a still large 42%, with the remainder spread among other creditors.
41
In summation, the period 1870 to 1914 is now rightly regarded as an epoch of
economic globalization as great as, or even greater than (by some measures), the one we
live  in  today.  Ratios  of  trade  and  foreign  investment  to  GDP,  and  the  scale  of
international migrations, make this period stand out from its predecessors, and the period
that immediately followed.
42 Whether this phase of globalization was more economic
than  political  will  continue  to  fire  debates—but  the  independent  Latin  American
countries were major players in the process.
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Under these conditions global foreign investments climbed to levels not seen
before, and the flows to Latin America surged again in the last great wave of the long
nineteenth century from 1900 to 1914. This was one of the smoother booms for the
countries of the region. Some had sorted out the worst of their fiscal problems and the
post-independence era with its dysfunctional political economy and endless wars was
becoming a distant memory. Many countries now aspired to adopt the gold standard,
joining  the  core  countries  in  establishing  a  globally  stable  monetary  system  that
facilitated commercial and financial transactions. There were few warning signs that
economic turmoil lay ahead for the countries in the region. Here and in so many other
respects, their fate was to rapidly to change once the shocks of the interwar period were
unleashed.
The Interwar Crisis of World Capital Markets
In the space of the next few decades, the integrated global markets for goods, capital, and
labor that had been built over the course of the long nineteenth century were effectively
destroyed.  Their  former  vigor  and  sudden  disappearance  was  lamented  by
contemporaries, but with the historian’s benefit of hindsight, and the economist’s bent for
quantitative measurement, we are better placed now to understand this phase of closure in
world markets in a sharper long-run and comparative perspective.
The outbreak of war led to capital controls, and this step, along with subsequent
inflationary war finance, marked the effective end of the gold standard regime in the
combatant countries until its ill-fated resumption in the late 1920s. Reliant on heavy
borrowing in the United States, the European core countries were no longer in any
position to export capital to the developing world as they had during the previous golden
age. Britain’s role, so essential to the pre-1914 global capital market emerged, from the
war quite diminished and from 1918 through the 1920s explicit embargoes on foreign
investment were occasionally implemented. Britain had supplied the region with £89
million ($431 million) in public loans from 1900 to 1913, but from 1918 to 1931 supplied
only £55 million ($250 million); in contrast, from 1918 to 1931 the United States
supplied the vast majority of the roughly $2,000 total in public loans that were issued,
with Britain only accounting for roughly one eighth.
43
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The center of the world capital market gradually shifted from London to New
York in these years as a result, but the American capacity to supply funds to the rest of
the world did not as rapidly fill the void left by the British.
44 The shift was by no means
smooth, but by the late 1920s capital flows to the region had recovered and in some boom
years surpassed the levels seen in the last boom of 1900–14 (Figure 2). There was
considerable distress in the region in the wartime years: Brazil defaulted again, for
example, as did Uruguay and revolutionary Mexico; but Argentina did not, despite a
brutal recession. The 1920s were then a period of marked improvement for Latin
borrowers, notwithstanding the still uncertain outlook in the world economy. In fact, for a
few brief years in the late 1920s no Latin American government was formally in default,
though this was soon to change (Figures 1 and 2).
Uncertainty in the global economy reflected the postwar tensions and distrust.
Although efforts were undertaken in the 1920s to rebuild the gold standard, free capital
markets from wartime controls, and undo the tariffs and quotas imposed on trade,
progress was slow, and ended in 1929. The arrival of the world depression brought
macroeconomic crisis to the region and its creditors and trading partners. Default became
widespread again and country risk exploded again in the uncertain environment (Figure
3). The gold standard went into its final death throes. Commodity prices, key to most of
the region’s export performance, continued a steep downward trend that had begun
earlier in the 1920s. To the extent that markets remained open for goods trade or capital
export, the channels increasingly turned to favor connections with colonies or with
bilateral partners willing to make a deal.
45
The commitment to an open, multilateral, world economic order would then
remain dormant for most of the rest of the twentieth century, until reviving recently. This
had a predictable impact on the periphery, where markets for their exports dried up, and
sources of credit failed. The impact was, understandably, felt hardest in the countries
which had, up to then, been most dependent on foreign capital and trade, and which, by
dint of their political independence, couldn’t count a break from anybody’s imperial
preferences. As we have noted, that region was Latin America. In this region, in these
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times, force of circumstances demanded new economic thinking, and gave birth to new
ideologies. The inward turn by the core hurt economically in the short run, but in the
longer run did more damage by undermining outward-oriented development strategies,
creating an understandable isolationist backlash that would endure for decades, and still
haunts us in the present.
Some measures of the impact of closure in global capital markets can be gleaned
from data on foreign investments from this period. In all developing countries foreign
investment as a fraction of GDP remained static between 1914 and the 1930s at around
95%, although foreign direct investment actually rose slightly from 40% to 51%. The
latter is an intriguing, perhaps a reflection of a need for control in the face of increased
economic and political risk and the temptation to “tariff hop” in an age of increased
protectionism. However, all of the FDI increase was contained in colonies, and none in
the independent countries, which essentially means Latin America.
46 Although FDI
volumes held up, other components did not. The ratio of total foreign investment to GDP
fell by almost a half in Latin America during this same period, from the level of 2.7 in
1914 to 1.3 in 1929 and 0.87 in 1938. If the FDI component was fairly level in this
period, then the remaining investments, debt and other equity, initially accounting for
half of the total, effectively vanished. No other region saw so quite dramatic a retreat of
foreign capital from such high levels: in Africa the FI/GDP ratio fell from 1.3 in 1914 to
0.35 in 1938, in Asia from 0.4 to 0.26.
47 Evidently the spike in U.S. capital flows to the
region seen in Figure 2 was rather brief, and apart from that blip foreign capital inflows
ran mostly dry in this period.
This starvation of investible funds proved very damaging to the economies of the
region, since a switch to alternative domestic sources of savings supply was quite
infeasible in the short run. Even by 1914, domestic capital markets in Latin American
countries remained weak. Foreign capital, in contrast, came (and also went) embedded in
an  organizational  form,  with  branch  banks  and  distant  stock  markets  that  gave
institutional support to the problem of raising finance. Though domestic markets are not
the topic of this chapter it is crucial to recognize their interaction, on important margins,
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with external finance.
48 Not only did foreign capital bring the resources themselves, it
also brought the financial technologies and acumen, the human capital of the financial
business enterprise; that is, solutions to both the problems of mobilization and allocation.
When the capital left, so did many of the slowly learnt entrepreneurial skills.
Problems of misallocation arose. In the country most affected by the withdrawal of
foreign capital, Argentina, domestic banks tried to fill the void, but only filled their
balance  sheets  with  bad  loans,  with  eventually  calamitous  effects  on  the  whole
macroeconomic regime.
49 But even with sound allocation a deeper problem was how to
generate a domestic savings supply equal to the “lost” foreign savings. In some countries,
up to half of capital accumulation had been foreign financed, as we have seen. Could
domestic savings be doubled overnight to fill the gap? Of course not, since savings are a
notoriously slowly evolving component of GDP, determined by many factors, notably
expectations for future economic growth and demography, as well as the tax structure,
financial frictions, and a host of other influences. Research indicates that here Latin
America  would  find  no  easy  solution.  Much,  if  not  all,  of  the  inflow  of  foreign
investment to the countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico before 1914 was in
essence a response not just to an “investment opportunity gap” (higher return projects on
the periphery, so higher demand) but also a “savings supply gap” (higher savings
capabilities in the core, so higher supply). The former is often stressed as part of the story
of economic development, but the latter can make a huge difference depending on
whether the external accounts are open or closed.
50
The major consequences of this shift in capital markets can be guessed at, and in
some cases have been measured. The effects were seen from 1914 to 1929, and later.
Growth slowed in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, and in the core itself. But the
misfortunes  of  the  core  during  and  after  the  great war—isolation, hyperinflations,
excessive debts—were not essentially Latin American problems (though they would be
later).  Instead,  the  problems  of  the  core  were  visited  on  Latin  America  through
international transmission mechanisms in goods and factor markets. The fall in the terms
of trade in the former, and the rising scarcity of capital in the latter were fundamental,
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and intertwined, shocks to the region’s growth prospect. In a country such as Argentina,
most of the retardation relative to the core during the intewar period is attributable to the
sudden collapse in foreign capital supply.
51
In the 1930s, the situation grew gloomier. The core was mired in its deepest
recession yet from 1929 to the bottom in 1933. The gold standard had been patchily
rebuilt only to fail again, with Britain suspending in 1931 and the U.S. in 1933. Capital
controls and competitive devaluations were breaking out as macroeconomic policy
became activist and non-cooperative. Tariff and quota wars, already looming in the
1920s, reached full force with after the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act in the U.S. and the
British imperial preferences adopted in Ottawa.
Set this example, and with not much to lose by then, Latin American countries
joined in the spirit of these policies, especially the larger countries which adopted a new
“reactive” stance in policymaking. In capital markets, the measures began with capital
controls, and were sometimes followed by attempts to manage multiple exchange-rate
regimes, an exercise in trying to apply multiple prices for a single good (money) that led
immediately to a black market. According to Bratter’s chronology, most of the controls
were put in place between 1931 and 1936 (Table 6). This represented a serious departure
from the principles of sound finance.
The geographical variation in these controls has always invited comment on the
political economy of the process. When the Monroe Doctrine is to be invoked as a causal
factor, it is noted that the smaller countries of Central America, and also Mexico, stand
out among the countries not adopting controls—and these are the same countries with
heavy exposure to U.S. investments. Beside the 800-pound gorilla, an alternative or
complementary explanation for the pattern might be the internal political economy of
each country in the region, where the structure of the polity, measured by representation,
autocratic tendencies and democratic pressure, also partially explains the outcome. The
most “reactive” countries also tended to be those most open to democratic or, in the
sphere of economics, “populist” pressure. In line with the argument of Eichengreen for
the core, drawing on Polanyi, we would expect such countries to feel most acutely the
tensions in the classic macroeconomic “trilemma”: that no economy can simultaneously
have both a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility, and an activist monetary policy.
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Only two out of three are feasible, and pressure for the third inevitably compromises the
first two “gold standard rules.”
52
Despite the seeming departures from the principles of sound finance signaled by
the abandonment of gold, wholesale default, and widespread controls, many countries in
Latin America remained engaged with capital markets as best they could in the 1930s. A
small few, notably Argentina, did not default, and they were rewarded with favorable
access to the new trickles of capital in the late 1930s. Perhaps hoping for a resumption of
normalcy,  negotiations  continued  with  creditors  to  renegotiate  debts.  Soon  other
governments could borrow once again, partly because recovery in the region was faster
than elsewhere in the world, and partly because many governments had shrunk their debt
burden through the unsavory and clandestine buyback of their own debt at a deep
discount in the secondary market. Through such tricks, unilateral offers to creditors, or by
renegotiation several countries achieved substantial debt forgiveness. In this decade, at
least, default had little stigma attached—almost every bank, enterprise, or country was
afflicted by it. Reputations could be rebuilt, then, but as it would turn out another war and
a global policy response that would seek to contain haute finance would soon render
these efforts moot, and no significant capital flows would be seen again in the region for
three of four decades.
53
By the end of the 1930s, the stand off was complete. Investors in the core
countries had virtually abandoned periphery, either by dint of their own domestic
controls, controls in the developing countries, or just because of a general increase in
economic and political risk in the world as a whole. The Great Depression is a defining
moment in world economic history precisely because it was the emergence of these
frictions that shaped the greater part of twentieth-century experience. From the 1940s to
the 1980s, the constraints on global capital markets were to fluctuate, but not until the
1990s did notions of globalization surface again, and even then, it could be said,
prematurely.
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The Postwar Period
Virtually no foreign capital flowed from rich to poor countries for most of the postwar
period. A flow picked up in the 1980s and 1990s, but it tended to flow to areas other than
Latin America, taking this region that was once highly favored by world investors down a
different path. In 1914, and similarly in 1938, the region accounted for about 55% of
world stock of foreign investment in developing countries, but by 1990 only 37%.
Though Latin American postwar economic history labors under the perjorative
“inward-looking development” label, it is important to recall that postwar economic
isolation was the norm, in both core and periphery, from the start. Trade barriers
remained  high  globally  as  GATT  (now  the  WTO)  began  it  task  of  rebuilding  a
multilateral trading system. By the 1970s and 1980s the work of GATT was bearing fruit,
though the successive (Tokyo, Kennedy, and Uruguay) rounds of negotiations, although
progress was generally slower in developing countries than in the core. In capital
markets, however, progress was slow everywhere.
It is crucial to see developing country policies in the larger, global context. Under
the articles of the IMF, the new watchdog of international finance, capital mobility was
initially repressed. Architects of the Bretton Woods system, like Keynes and White,
sought to protect trade, and a system of fixed exchange rates, and feared that footloose
capital would threaten one or both. In Europe, even current account transactions remained
inconvertible in the late 1940s and 1950s, necessitating a cumbersome bilateral payments
system to keep trade flowing. The dollar was for a while the only freely convertible
currency, but other core currencies joined in the 1960s. This was the end of the Bretton
Woods system, as even limited mobility put strains on the balance of payments of
member countries. Exchange rate pressure hit Britain and Germany, and then ultimately
the United States, and in 1973 the dollar floated, taking others with it.
54
Sitting on the sidelines in this period, most developing countries bided their time
and maintained currency controls, even multiple exchange rates, being unwilling to risk
their fixed pegs in a truly open capital market. This did not, of course, insulate them from
devaluation pressures, as black market rates slid away from official rates, and periodic
official depreciations were enacted to maintain some illusion of respectability.
55 In this
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way, most of the policy innovations of the 1930s, forged during the great economic crisis,
eventually  persisted  and  became  established  components  in  the  postwar  policy
environment, an era of dirigisme and short-lived faith in state planning.
56 Once again, we
should stress that in terms of macroeconomic distortions, at this time Latin America did
not stand out from other parts of the periphery. Table 7 (panel 1) shows that in the 1960s,
level of the black market premium, distortions in relative capital prices, and rates of
depreciation were fairly high in both Asia and Latin America.
The comparative picture soon changed. By the 1970s and 1980s observers started
to notice a troubling phenomenon. Notwithstanding the predictions of theory, enough
economic data was by then being collected to permit serious empirical research on
policies and growth in the postwar period. (This became a major academic industry in the
1990s.) Econometric evidence confirmed what was starting to become obvious to the
naked eye: four East Asian NICs had radically shifted their orientation towards openness,
and were reaping rewards in fast export-led growth. Latin American economies, still
locked into a more autarkic position floundered. Table 7 (panel 2) also shows this
development. Detail in panel 3 shows some surprising policy persistence from the 1930s:
still the most reactive countries, where distortions ran highest, were those in the Southern
Cone. The extent to which this policy mix retarded Latin American growth is central to
policy debates today, and the issue of openness has been extensively discussed. There are
few robust correlations in the growth literature, and maybe the only one is between
investment and growth; thus, understanding why the region invested so little can explain
why growth was so slow.
57
What then is the importance of this discussion for our understanding of foreign
investment? Foreign investment, as noted already, fills the “gap” between domestic
saving and domestic investment. But if the latter is repressed, there may be no gap left to
fill. This turns out to be a fairly accurate description of postwar Latin America. In
econometric exercises one can show that the distortions in Table 8 accounted for almost
all of the region’s low investment rate and low growth, relative to the NICs.
58 In a
counterfactual  where  such  distortions  are  removed  what  would  have  happened?
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Investment rates (and growth) would have surged, pulling in huge amounts of financing
from abroad as a side effect. For the region as a whole, investment as a share of GDP
would have risen by about five percentage points, something similar in magnitude to the
capital flows seen before 1914. Thus the potential was there for Latin America to
reintegrate into a global capital market after World War Two, but policy-induced
frictions barred the way.
59
Is this a convincing explanation why capital did not flow to Latin America and
most other developing countries? Another way of looking at this problem proves
instructive, where instead of looking at econometric quantity estimates we look instead
directly at investment prices and expected returns. An exercise of this form was proposed
by Robert Lucas, who used the simple uniform technology Cobb-Douglas production
function for per capita income, y = f(k) = A k
α where k is capital per person, and a is
capital’s share of income.
60 Under the critical, but implausible, assumption of identical
technologies across countries (A is constant), then the marginal product of capital,
MPK=lf´(k) = α A k
a-1 varies inversely with y, such that for two countries (MPK1 / MPK2)
= (y1 / y2) 
(α-1)/α. In this set up, when α=0.4 and India has a per capita income 1/15 that of
the U.S., we predict a marginal product of capital in India 58 times that in the U.S. Such
arbitrage opportunities seem unlikely, casting doubt on assumptions of perfect capital
mobility or uniform technologies or both.
The mystery soon vanishes once one begins to use auxiliary information on each
of these assumptions. Capital prices are heavily distorted upwards in many developing
countries, as we have seen, so that the returns to investment are pushed down due to to
the high cost of (physical) capital. Uniform technologies in the U.S. and India would also
imply that the capital output ratio k/y (a scalar multiple of MPK) would also be 58 times
higher in India, yet data on capital stocks can be adduced to falsify this assumption.
Correcting for both these problems, an appropriate measure of the differential marginal
incentive to invest in two economies is (MPK1 / MPK2) = (y1 / p1 k1) / (y2 / p2 k2), where p
is the relative price of capital and k the capital per person.
Compared to the raw measure, this measure shows remarkably little variation
across countries in the postwar period, as seen in Table 8. Lucas’s raw measure of MPK
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(column 2) implies huge incentives to move capital to all regions, with MPKs at least 10
times the U.S. level, sometimes over 100 times, except in the NICs: a huge market
failure? Not so, once we correct for technology differences (column 3) and price
distortions (column 5). The first correction lowers the disperson of MPKs considerably
(column 4), though still with an 80% premium in Latin America and over 100% in Africa
and South Asia. But those turn out to have been the economies with the most distorted
prices, so this correction eliminates all of the excess marginal return in every region, such
that in the end the range of MPKs is from 90% to 130% of the U.S. level. Thus, even
absent explicit capital controls (which were only lifted fairly recently), unless underlying
distortions had changed there was little incentive for capital to migrate to Latin America.
A Long Run Summary
To summarize, only recently have economic reforms began to undo the price distortions
that have been built into the Latin American economies since the generalized interwar
autarky and specific policy reactions of the 1930s. Prior to those reforms the region
remained  unattractive  to  foreign  investors  not  only  because  of  its  low  levels  of
technology (low productivity) but also because unfortunate price twists lowered the
realizable rate of return on capital. As a result, investment and accumulation was
effectively constrained to a lower level, limited by the mobilizing determinants of
domestic saving and the allocating capacities of the domestic financial system—and
economic growth was held in check.
61 Yet if the region were to embrace the kinds of
policies seen in the late nineteenth century, there is reason to believe that a similar degree
of globalization in the capital market would ensue, with positive spillovers for aggregate
growth.
Between the past and present eras of globalization, Latin America, like the rest of
the world participated in the dramatic ebb and flow of foreign capital seen everywhere,
the only difference being that the retreat was sharper and the resurgence slower. In this,
Latin America followed a pattern generally shared throughout the periphery, only more
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so. A few summary statistics round out this picture. An examination of Twomey’s
foreign investment data for the entire developing world in Table 9 recaps some of the
data mentioned so far and presents it in a coherent fashion for the whole twentieth
century. In panel A, total foreign investment (in constant 1900 dollars) rose rapidly to
1914, reaching $15 million; then fell to 1929, and remained at or below its 1914 level
until well into the 1960s.
This was roughly half a century of lost progress, given the overall growth of the
world economy and the divergence in income levels over this period, factors that would
have led one to expect ever increasing investment flows. Slowly, the flows began again
and rose by a factor of 3 to 1980, and by a factor of 5 to 1990. This certainly looks like a
resumption of globalization, until one considers the normalization more carefully. In
panel B, we see that relative to GDP, foreign investment has reached nothing like the
levels seen in 1914, and as of 1990 was at roughly one half the peak level, 42% versus
89%. The fall in Latin America is greater still, from 270% to 47%, with only a small rise
from 1967 to 1990. The rather more impressive surge to Asia, a tripling in FI/GDP since
1967, is indicative of a general shift in the most desired location for foreign investment
over the century. An important part of this story would be the “economic miracles” of
first Japan, and then the East Asian NICs.
However, some countries have experienced an increase in FI/GDP ratios to levels
above and beyond those seen in 1914. These are the core countries, and, for this to be
consistent with the above data, it goes without saying that the gross flows from the core
countries are now, principally, to other core countries. What is going on? The key
difference today is that globalization in capital markets though high in such crude volume
terms, has a very different form than 100 years ago.
62 Most gross capital flows are forms
of portfolio risk diversification flows between developed countries, and very little takes
the form of development finance in the poorer countries.
This is clearly seen in Figure 4, using a broader data set for all foreign investment.
Here we see an inverse U-shape, with a different message. As can be seen, Latin America
and all developing countries saw their share of world liabilities peak in the mid century.
At that point, the periphery stocks of foreign capital accumulated before 1914 were still
present and growing, and the core was in disarray. After the war, those stocks began to
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atrophy: nationalizations, expropriations, capital mobility restrictions, price distortions,
devaluations and defaults took their toll on existing assets and discouraged new flows
from coming. Especially after Bretton Woods broke (the 1970s) and core countries
liberalized the capital account (the 1980s), the core countries found themselves able and
willing to invest in each other.
The IMF design succeeded in its own way. Capital flows were repressed for two
or three decades. To some degree, so were major developing country macroeconomic and
financial crises, especially the latter.
63 And debt crises were ipso facto ruled out since
there was so little portfolio investment to speak of. Once capital flows resumed under the
less restricted global capital markets of the post-Bretton Woods era major crises have
again swept over the region in a manner eerily reminiscent of the experiences from the
1820s to the 1930s. Sovereign debt issues exploded in the 1970s, especially to banks in
core countries eager to find new investments during the growth slowdown of the 1970s
and recycle the so-called petrodollars of newly-rich OPEC creditors. International bank
lending to the “Big 3”—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—doubled from 1979 to 1981. In
1982 a default crisis engulfed these countries and many others in the region and
elsewhere on the periphery. A recession in the core, high interest rates, weak commodity
prices and overborrowing caused another déja vù. Renegotiations and an orderly work
out of this fiasco took almost a decade. The door to global financial markets was
temporarily shut once again and the region endured more political and economic turmoil
as fiscal adjustments ensued, inflations and hyperinflations were tamed, and political
regimes (democratic or otherwise) came and went.
64
Another boom and bust cycle soon followed, and the two can be seen in Figure 5.
The emerging market boom of the early 1990s led some to believe that a new era was
about to begin under the sway of “neoliberal” policy reforms, with development finance
flowing to the periphery as it had in the distant past, both to public and private recipients
this time, and with more and more countries imitating the NICs and experiencing
convergence to high levels of income. It hasn’t quite happened yet. The crises and
contagions of the late 1990s, not least in the East Asian miracle countries themselves,
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have disrupted that cosy vision of the future, and we are left with the realization that
supposed policy reforms have, in many cases, been adopted weakly, if at all.
Whether there was a convergence of developing countries on a “neoliberal
consensus” in the 1990s is a matter of debate. That there was is a popular belief, but
widespread evidence remains to be found in the actual data used by political scientists
and other researchers to assess changes in economic and political regimes. Overall,
measured by the admittedly crude indices of corruption, rule of law, and the like, the
institutional  gap  between  rich  and  poor  countries  has  remained  wide.
65  But  such
characteristics, or deep determinants, do not directly illuminate the recent crises, where
the more proximate causes appear to involve an embrace of open capital markets without
an adequate of the implications and constraints on other economic policies. There
remains a possible role of contagion and “animal spirits” in the market, though proving
the existence of these forces has proved difficult for economic researchers in the 1990s
crises. The presence of poor fundamentals has been more robustly identified, as in the
crony financial structures and fiscal weakness of the Argentine state.
66
However, the “Washington consensus” account of the 1990s should not be
overemphasized. Although the recent opening of capital markets has been tried here and
there with mixed degrees of enthusiasm and mixed results, the overall record for the
region as a whole (and the rest of the world) suggests that the opening of developing
countries on the capital account has proceed very slowly indeed, and measures of capital
account restrictions show that these countries remain on the whole very closed compared
to the developed countries, as shown in Figure 6. The restrictions measure takes a zero or
one value and is averaged across all countries, using the left scale. We see that in 1970
about 80% of advanced countries had closed capital markets, falling to 10% in 1998. But
in developing countries the ratio has remained fairly steady at around 80% for the entire
period. The opening of markets has been unevenly spread across countries and the timing
has been spasmodic. The pattern in Latin America shows considerable shifts in policy: a
shift to openness in the 1970s coincided with a major capital inflow, but controls were
reimposed in several countries in 1978–82 as the debt crisis unfolded. Controls were only
later lowered in the early 1990s, when a new influx began.
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In the same figure, it is striking, also, how these measures of restrictions correlate
with the extent of foreign investment in each region of country grouping, measured by
the ratio of foreign investment (proxied by cumulated capital inflows) to GDP, using the
right scale. Note that the scale for developed countries is different: they have witnessed a
huge expansion of foreign investment from about 0.15 to 1.3 on this scale, almost a ten
fold increase. The other scales only run up to 0.3 and reflect the much smaller flows of
foreign capital to developing countries. There, the ratio has risen from 0.15 to about 0.35,
a little more than doubling. The rise was somewhat steeper in Asia, but rather flatter in
Latin America.
The lessons from these data are clear: for all the talk of the globalization of capital
markets in the last few years, two facts have been overlooked. First, the process has been
going on for two or three decades. Second, the process has largely by passed developing
countries, and in large part that reflects their choice, that is, the persistence of autarkic
policies in those countries, combined with an institutional environment inimical to
foreign investment. Overall, we might wonder not at how much capital has penetrated
developing countries today, but how little. As we have already seen in Figure 5, capital
flows to developing countries are far smaller today than in the first age of globalization.
The contrast with the historical position in 1913 adds greater perspective and only
reinforces  the  impression  that  the  intellectual  frenzy  over  recent  symptoms  of
globalization has been overwrought and misdirected. A century ago a much greater share
of global finance reached poorer countries, and not just under the auspices of empire. The
volume of capital flows, although higher to colonies, was not higher to rich countries.
67
Colonies and independent regions like Latin America all had access to the London capital
market. From an analytical perspective, the region gave an important test case for
historical explanations that rely on the logic of trade (and finance) “following the flag.”
In the so-called “Age of Empire” here was the first, and at that time only, developing
region to have achieved total independence. At the same time it was able to enjoy access
to world markets for goods and capital, often to a greater extent than the many of the
colonies  themselves.  It  made  both  sovereign  issues  and  private-sector  issues,  and
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attracted direct and portfolio investment.
68 Country risk was not significantly higher for
non-Empire countries, once we control for policy choices and other characteristics. Why
is today’s globalization so different?
69
Problems in sequencing reforms have exposed many countries to highly mobile
capital flows at a time when their financial systems, regulatory and oversight capacity,
and institutional strength have still changed little. This has raised questions as to whether
international  capital  mobility  can  serve  to  benefit  developing  countries  without
complementary  reforms  that  attack  corruption,  enhance  rule  of  law,  increase
transparency, and strengthen property rights. In Latin America, the Argentine debacle of
2001 exposed key weaknesses in all these areas, and left a very bitter taste. Once paraded
as a model of emerging market success, it has reverted from poster child to enfant
terrible.
Without fundamental institutional reforms the region may not be able to handle
foreign investments, but it could benefit from them if it can establish a stable order. In
Latin America since 1914 foreign capital has played only a minor role, a parallel of the
trend in most developing countries. In contrast the first era of globalization a century ago,
most of the postwar investment successes and failures of the region have been home
grown. Under these conditions per capita incomes in the region have not fallen behind the
core in relative terms.
70 But they did not achieve rapid convergence to the core’s level of
income per capita, as one might have hoped. Some of this persistent divergence is
technological, and can trace its origins to the uneven spread of the industrial revolution
and subsequent technological advances since the mid 1800s. But a large share of the gap,
perhaps one third to one half, is attributable to capital formation.
71
For poor countries with low savings, capital formation can only be quickly and
significantly augmented through an external supply of capital that is allowed to flow
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without impediments.
72 This was an option exploited by much of the region from 1870 to
1914 with reasonably favorable results for aggregate growth, but under political economy
equilibria that were sympathetic to the domestic policy constraints implied by open
capital markets. The subsequent historical record shows that most of the world remained
closed to foreign capital until the last decade or two, and, in comparative terms, Latin
America opted for choices quite that were some of the most autarkic. In the last decade a
greater inclination of developing economies to open capital markets has often collided
with political economy constraints that have generated serious crises as policymakers
struggle to follow the implied rules of the game.
                                                   
72 If technology levels remain low in the region, gains could be small. But Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002)
show convincingly that access to foreign capital combined with an elimination of domestic distortions can
generate significant welfare gains.35
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Table 1
Default History of Latin American Government Bonds Issued in the 1820s
Country Principal owed Resolution, if any
Brazil £21,129,000 Arrears on interest paid and service resumed in 1829.
Mexico 6,400.000 Refinancing in 1831 to cover principal and arrears on
interest. Quickly defaulted on. New refinancing in 1837.
More defaults and refunding. Resolved 1864.
Costa Rica 13,608 Inherited share of Central American confederation debt.
Principal paid off in 1840, but not arrears on interest.
Chile 1,000,000 Arrears on interest paid and service resumed in 1842.




3,375,000 Inherited 50% share of Gran Colombia debt. Principal and
arrears paid off by new loan in 1845. Default in 1850.
Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in 1861.
Venezuela 1,923,750 Inherited 28.5% share of Gran Colombia debt. Principal and
arrears paid off by new loan in 1841. Default in 1847. New
arrangements and further defaults then follow.
Ecuador 1,451,259 Inherited 21.5% share of Gran Colombia debt. Principal paid
off by new loan in 1855. Arrears cancelled in exchange for
land warrants and Peruvian bonds. Default in 1868.
Guatemala 68,741 Inherited share of Central American confederation debt.
Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in 1856.
Buenos Aires 1,000,000 Resumed service in 1857.
El Salvador 27,217 Inherited share of Central American confederation debt. Paid
off 90% of debt in 1860, but balance not until 1877.
Honduras 27,217 Inherited share of Central American confederation debt.
Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in 1867.
Nicaragua 27,717 Inherited share of Central American confederation debt. Paid
off 85% of debt face value in 1874.
Source: Rippy (1959, 26–28).
Note: Poyais is omitted.
Table 2
British Investments in Latin America at the End of 1880




Argentina £20,338,709 9,105,009 11,233,700 —
Bolivia 1,654,000 — 1,654,000 1,654,000 (1875)
Brazil 38,869,067 15,808,905 23,060,102 —
Chile 8,466,521 701,417 7,765,104 —
Costa Rica 3,304,000 — 3,304,000 3,304,000 (1874)
Cuba 1,231,600 1,231,600 n.a. n.a.
Dominican Republic 714,300 — 714,300 714,300 (1872)
Ecuador 1,959,380 135,380 1,724,000 1,824,000 (1868)
Guatemala 544,200 — 544,200 544,200 (1876)
Honduras 3,222,000 — 3,222,000 3,222,000 (1872)
Mexico 32,740,916 9,200,116 23,540,800 23,540,800 (1866)
Nicaragua 206,570 23,540,800 — —
Paraguay 1,505,400 — 1,505,400 1,505,400 (1874)
Peru 36,177,070 3,488,750 32,688,320 32,688,320 (1876)
Uruguay 7,644,105 4,124,885 3,519,220 —
Venezuela 7,564,390 1,161,590 6,402,800 —
General 10,274,660 10,274,660 n.a. n.a.
Total £179,490,261 56,412,255 123,078,006 71,097,020
Source: Rippy (1959, 25, 32).42
Table 3
Gross Capital Flows from Britain, 1865–1914
Distribution
of which: World Periphery
Government Private Railways Total
World — — — 3,366 100% —
Periphery — — — 1,571 47% —
of which:
Latin America
Argentina 78 271 201 349 — 22%
Brazil 79 93 55 173 — 11%
Mexico 16 65 30 82 — 5%
Chile 29 32 15 62 — 4%
Peru 26 11 4 37 — 2%
Uruguay 10 21 16 31 — 2%
Cuba 6 20 13 26 — 2%
Total 760 — 48%
Other periphery
India 145 172 128 317 — 20%
Russia 70 69 35 139 — 9%
Japan 73 6 2 78 — 5%
China 48 25 15 74 — 5%
Egypt 23 43 1 66 — 4%
Turkey 25 18 9 42 — 3%
Italy 23 18 10 41 — 3%
Spain 8 26 8 34 — 2%
Greece 17 2 0 19 — 1%
Total 812 — 52%
Notes and Source: Millions of pounds, from Stone (1999).
Table 4
Cumulative Gross Capital Flows from Britain to Latin America, 1880–1913
growth rates
1880– 1890– 1900–
Type Country 1880 share 1890 share 1900 share 1913 share 1890 1900 1913
Private Argentina 9 3% 78 10% 102 10% 257 12% 24% 3% 7%
Brazil 10 3% 29 4% 40 4% 90 4% 11% 3% 6%
Chile 1 0% 12 2% 18 2% 32 2% 28% 4% 4%
Cuba 1 0% 3 0% 6 1% 20 1% 8% 7% 10%
Mexico 4 1% 19 2% 27 2% 64 3% 17% 4% 7%
Peru 2 1% 5 1% 6 1% 11 1% 10% 1% 5%
Uruguay 5 2% 12 2% 14 1% 20 1% 9% 2% 3%
These 7 32 11% 157 20% 212 20% 494 24% 17% 3% 7%
All countries 296 100% 770 100% 1,064 100% 2,065 100% 10% 3% 5%
All Argentina 21 3% 132 10% 160 9% 332 10% 20% 2% 6%
Brazil 22 4% 56 4% 74 4% 166 5% 10% 3% 6%
Chile 8 1% 22 2% 33 2% 60 2% 11% 4% 5%
Cuba 1 0% 3 0% 6 0% 26 1% 8% 7% 13%
Mexico 5 1% 26 2% 39 2% 80 3% 18% 4% 6%
Peru 27 4% 30 2% 30 2% 37 1% 1% 0% 2%
Uruguay 7 1% 20 1% 23 1% 30 1% 11% 2% 2%
These 7 90 15% 289 22% 365 20% 732 23% 12% 2% 6%
All countries 599 100% 1,334 100% 1,812 100% 3,203 100% 8% 3% 4%
Notes and Source: Millions of pounds, from Stone (1999).43
Table 5
Counterfactual: Latin America without Foreign Capital in 1913–14
counterfactual
estimated (capital share=1/3)
Country GDP FI FI/GDP FI/K (COR=4) GDP change
Argentina 107 279 2.60 0.65 75 -30%
Brazil 23 68 2.96 0.74 15 -36%
Chile 58 122 2.11 0.53 45 -22%
Colombia 38 10 0.27 0.07 37 -2%
Cuba 127 175 1.38 0.35 110 -13%
Guatemala 38 62 1.66 0.42 32 -16%
Honduras 32 50 1.56 0.39 27 -15%
Mexico 49 90 1.83 0.46 40 -18%
Paraguay 41 35 0.86 0.22 38 -8%
Peru 33 40 1.21 0.30 29 -11%
Uruguay 106 172 1.62 0.41 89 -16%
Venezuela 18 17 0.98 0.25 16 -9%
All 670 1120 1.67 0.42 559 -17%
Source: Twomey (1998)
Table 6
Latin America’s Adoption of Capital Controls as of 1939
Exchange Control, 1930–39 Free Market Activity Black
Country None Begun Abolished Tolerated Controls None Market
Argentina 1931 •
Bolivia 1931 • •
Brazil 1931 •
Chile 1931 •
Colombia 1931 • •
Costa Rica 1932 •
Cuba • •
Dominican Republic • •
Ecuador 1933 1937 •













Distortions in Latin America, 1960–90
PRICE Latin
BLACK OF DEPRE- America
MARKET TARIFF CAPITAL CIATION rank
1960s
All 0.17 — 0.41 0.03
Latin America 0.12 — 0.25 0.07
Southern Cone 0.16 — 0.39 0.21
Asia-Pacific 0.08 — 0.21 0.08
NIC4 0.10 — 0.25 0.04
1970s/80s
All 0.27 0.17 0.44 0.10
Latin America 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.37
Southern Cone 0.32 0.27 0.19 0.60
Asia-Pacific 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.02
NIC4 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.00
Southern Cone 0.32 0.27 0.19 0.60
Argentina 0.33* 0.29* 0.34* 1.16* 1
Paraguay 0.29* 0.46* 0.46* 0.11 4
Chile 0.52* 0.21* 0.04 0.51* 5
Brazil 0.29* 0.16 0.09 0.83* 8
Uruguay 0.14 0.21* 0.04 0.41* 12
Others 0.24 0.19 0.30 0.28
Nicaragua 0.62* 0.15 0.48* 0.90* 2
Peru 0.26 0.41* 0.25 0.77* 3
El Salvador 0.56* 0.13 0.68* 0.06 6
Bolivia 0.32* 0.13 0.26* 0.62* 7
Venezuela 0.33* 0.18* 0.21 0.12 9
Costa Rica 0.18 0.16 0.33* 0.13 10
Colombia 0.08 0.31* 0.21 0.17 11
Ecuador 0.18 0.28* -0.08 0.18 12
Guatemala 0.14 0.08 0.51* 0.08 14
Mexico 0.10 0.08 0.22 0.27* 15
Honduras 0.14 — 0.36* 0.04 —
Panama 0.00 — 0.12 0.00 —
Notes: Annual averages from cross-section data. GROWTH: growth rate of per capita GDP; BLACK
MARKET: black-market premium on the exchange rate; TARIFF: own-weight tariff incidence; PRICE OF
CAPITAL: relative price of capital goods; DEPRECIATION: rate of depreciation of the currency. na: not
available. Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay; NIC4: South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Sources: Taylor (1998b).45
Table 8
Why Didn’t Capital Flow to Developing Countries?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lucas MPK PI/PY MPK
Income MPK K/Y (OECD=1) (World=1) K/Y (OECD=1)
per capita (OECD=1) World World Local Local Local
Region Int'l dollars (a=1/3) Prices Prices Prices Prices Prices
OECD 24,077 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0
Middle East 23,851 4.5 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.1
NIC 14,195 2.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9
Caribbean 12,047 14.8 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.9
Latin America 9,806 12.0 1.0 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.3
East Asia 5,285 24.0 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.2 0.9
Africa 3,551 129.5 0.6 3.3 2.7 1.7 1.1
South Asia 2,964 99.1 0.8 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.0
Source: Taylor (1998a). Omitted are the centrally-planned economies and Oceania.
Table 9
Foreign Investment in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, 1900–90
Year 1900 1914 1929 1938 1967 1980 1990
A. Foreign Investment
Total 6.3 15.7 11.0 11.6 16.5 45.5 74.5
Latin America 2.2 8.4 6.5 5.5 9.0 20.7 27.7
Share of total .35 .54 .59 .47 .55 .45 .37
Asia 1.8 5.1 3.7 4.8 4.7 13.7 30.7
Share of total .29 .32 .34 .41 .28 .30 .41
Africa 2.3 2.3 0.7 1.4 2.8 11.0 16.1
Share of total .37 .15 .06 .12 .17 .24 .22
B. Foreign Investment as a share of GDP
Latin America 1.20 2.71 1.26 0.87 0.33 0.33 0.47
Asia 0.17 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.32
Africa 1.33 1.17 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.34 0.74
Total 0.44 0.89 0.45 0.41 0.2 0.24 0.42
Notes: Panel A: Total stock of foreign investment, billions of U.S. dollars at 1900 U.S. prices. Panel B:
Same as a ratio to GDP, except for Argentina the dates are 1900, 1913, 1929, 1938, 1970, 1980, and 1989,
and the ratio calculation is at domestic prices.
Source: Twomey (1996, Tables 2, 4, 5).46
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Notes: Fraction of years in default shown in parentheses.
Sources: Default data from Tomz (2001), issue dates from Marichal (1989).47
Figure 2
























UK gross capital exports to Latin America, US $ million
at par, 3-year moving average (left scale)
US net capital exports to Latin America, US $ million, 3-
year moving average (left scale)
Total number of Latin American countries in default
(right scale)
Sources: Following Suter (1994); default data from Tomz (2001); U.K. flows from Stone (1999); U.S.












































































Source: Global Financial Data and other sources. See Obstfeld and Taylor (2003abc).49
 Figure 4






















1870 1900 1914 1930 1938 1945 1960 1971 1980 1985 1990 1995
Latin America liabilities/World liabilities
Developing country liabilities/World liabilities
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003ab).50
Figure 5
Boom and Bust Cycles, 1970–2000
Gross capital flows as a percent of GDP
Source: IMF (2001, Figure 4.1).51
Figure 6
Openness and Restrictions, 1970–2000
Source: IMF (2001, Figure 4.2).
Notes: The restriction measure is calculated as the “average” value of the on/off measure for the country
group. The openness measure is calculated as the average stock of accumulated capital flows (as percent of
GDP) in a country group. All respective left and right scales are the same, except in the first chart on the
right.